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Further Support for Mental Health Parity Law and 
Mandatory Mental Health and Substance Use 
Disorder Benefits 
 
Stacey A. Tovino, J.D., Ph.D.* 
This Article provides further support for my recent proposal to extend 
federal mental health parity law and mandatory mental health and substance 
use disorder benefits to all public healthcare program beneficiaries and 
private health plan members.1  In my recent proposal, I analyzed 
justifications provided by public healthcare programs and private health 
insurers for providing inferior insurance benefits2 for individuals with 
mental illness, including allegations that mental health care is more costly 
and less efficacious than physical health care and that individuals with 
mental illness have a greater role in, and responsibility for, their lack of 
health.3  I found that these reasons were not supported in the current 
clinical, economic, and social literatures.  More specifically, I found that the 
current health plan cost literature shows that untreated mental illness is 
associated with increases in total healthcare costs and that treatment of 
mental illness is associated with decreases in total healthcare costs.4  I 
further found that the current mental health economics literature shows that 
managed behavioral health care significantly reduces if not eliminates the 
problem of moral hazard in the context of mental health care.5  Recent 
 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  I 
thank John Valery White, Dean, William S. Boyd School of Law, for his financial support of 
this research project.  I also thank Jeanne Price (Director, Wiener-Rogers Law Library), 
Chad Schatzle (Reference Librarian, Wiener-Rogers Law Library), and Michael Vargas 
(former student at Boyd School of Law) for their outstanding assistance in locating many of 
the sources referenced in this Article.  I further thank the participants of the following 
symposia and meetings for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this 
Article: The 34th Annual Health Law Professors Conference sponsored by the American 
Society for Law, Medicine & Ethics and the Loyola University Chicago School of Law; The 
26th Annual Whittier Health Law Symposium of Whittier Law School; and The 64th Annual 
Meeting of the Southeastern Association for Law Schools. 
1. See Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal 
Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2012). 
2. See id. at Section I(A) (summarizing the historically inferior mental health insurance 
benefits provided by public health care programs and private health plans). 
3. See id. at Section I(B). 
4. See id. 
5. See id. 
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studies of cost data obtained from healthcare delivery settings in which 
mental health parity has been implemented show that mental health parity 
implementation has not increased total health care delivery costs in those 
settings.6  Recent studies of the relationship between untreated mental 
illness and other variables, including employment, disability, homelessness, 
welfare, and crime, show that individuals with untreated mental illness have 
not only higher total health care costs, but also lower rates of work 
productivity, higher rates of disability, higher rates of homelessness, higher 
rates of welfare, and higher rates of criminal activity, suggesting significant 
employer and public program returns on initial mental health treatment 
investments.7  Notwithstanding insurers’ claims that mental illness is too 
difficult to diagnose and treat relative to physical illness, I also found that 
the current medical and scientific literature shows that mental illnesses, on 
average, are as easily diagnosed and treated as are physical illnesses.8  
Despite judicial attempts in the context of health insurance coverage 
litigation to distinguish physical and mental illnesses based on a number of 
different tests that inquire into the area of specialization of the treating 
healthcare provider, the nature and type of treatment, and the origin and 
symptoms of the illness, I found that not one of these tests provides a 
rational or consistent method of distinguishing physical and mental illness.9 
In this Article, I would like to provide additional support for my proposal 
to extend federal mental health parity law and mandatory mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits to all public healthcare program 
beneficiaries and private health plan members.  I begin by examining 
health-related doctrine outside the context of mental health insurance law, 
including disability discrimination law, civil rights and human rights law, 
health information confidentiality law, healthcare reform law, and child and 
adult health and welfare law, and I find that not one of these laws provides 
inferior legal protections or benefits for individuals with mental illness.  I 
also analyze international, national, state, and professional definitions of 
“health” that are used in a range of clinical, legal, and social contexts and 
find that these definitions uniformly fail to subordinate mental health to 
physical health and that these definitions identify both physical wellness 
and mental wellness as equal contributors to overall health. I further suggest 
that remaining legal distinctions between physical and mental illness may 
emanate from the centuries-old mind-body problem, which continues to 
animate health law, philosophy of the mind, and other legal and 
philosophical doctrine. Finally, I suggest that the stigma associated with 
 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. at Section I(D). 
9. See id. at Section I(E). 
2012] Further Support for Mental Health Parity Law 149 
mental illness may be serving as a final – and perhaps the most formidable 
– obstacle to complete mental health parity. 
I. MENTAL ILLNESS IN OTHER LEGAL CONTEXTS 
In light of current federal mental health insurance law, which continues 
to allow some public healthcare program beneficiaries and private health 
plan members to be subject to mental health benefit disparities,10 I wanted 
to investigate whether other health-related laws continue to allow 
discrimination against individuals with mental illness and, if so, to explore 
the justifications provided for such discrimination.  I thus examine 
disability discrimination law, civil rights and human rights law, health 
information confidentiality law, healthcare reform law, and child and adult 
health and welfare law and find that not one of these areas of law provides 
inferior legal protections or benefits for individuals with mental illness. 
Federal disability discrimination law, including the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)11 as amended by the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”),12 equally protects from disability discrimination 
individuals with physical disabilities and individuals with mental 
disabilities.  President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into law on July 
26, 1990, to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.13  The 
original ADA provided a three-prong definition of disability, the first prong 
of which referred to both physical and mental impairments that 
substantially limit one or more major life activities of an individual.14  
Regulations implementing the original ADA defined “physical or mental 
impairment” to include any physiological disorder as well as any mental or 
psychological disorder, including mental retardation, organic brain 
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.15  
Although the ADA regulations defined the major life activities that must be 
substantially limited as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working,”16 the interpretation of the phrase “substantially limit” was left to 
the courts.  Before the enactment of the ADAAA, reviewing courts found 
that a number of individuals with physical and mental impairments, 
 
10. See id. at Section III(A)-(E). 
11. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) 
[hereinafter ADA]. 
12. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3533 (2008) 
[hereinafter ADAAA]. 
13. ADA, supra note 11. 
14. Id. § 3(2)(A)-(C) (pre-ADAAA definition of disability). 
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (2009). 
16. See id. § 1630.2(i). 
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including depressive and anxiety disorders, were not protected individuals 
with disabilities in part because their medications, psychotherapy, and other 
treatments constituted mitigating measures.17 
In order to reinstate a broad scope of protection for individuals with 
disabilities, President George W. Bush signed the ADAAA into law on 
September 25, 2008.18  The ADAAA retains the ADA’s basic three-prong 
definition of disability, including a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities;19 however, the 
ADAAA clarifies the interpretation of the definition of disability in several 
important ways.  For example, the ADAAA clarifies that an impairment 
that is episodic, such as bipolar disorder, remains a disability so long as it 
substantially limits a major life activity when active.20  It also clarifies that 
the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity should be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of 
mitigating measures, including psychotropic medications, learned 
behavioral modifications, and adaptive neurological modifications.21  
Finally, the ADAAA contains an expanded list of major life activities that 
now includes the operation of an individual’s neurological and brain 
functions.22 
On September 23, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) issued a proposed rule that would implement the 
ADAAA in the context of cases involving allegations of employment-based 
disability discrimination.23  As adopted in final form on March 25, 2011,24 
 
17. See e.g., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (declaring 
that mitigating measures encompass not only artificial aids, such as medications and devices, 
but also measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body’s own systems, 
including subconscious mechanisms for compensating and coping with visual impairments); 
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (noting that the 
determination of whether petitioner’s impairment substantially limited one or more major 
life activities was properly made with reference to the mitigating factor of blood pressure 
medication); Boerst v. Gen. Mills Operations, No. 01-1483, 2002 WL 59637 at *408 (6th 
Cir. Jan. 15, 2002) (“[The plaintiff’s] own testimony shows that he suffered no substantial 
limitation on his ability to work when Zoloft’s mitigating effects are taken into account.”); 
Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the claims of a 
pharmacist with diabetes who controlled his condition with insulin injections and a 
controlled diet); Nordwall v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 01-1691, 2002 WL 31027956 (7th 
Cir. Sept. 6, 2002) (dismissing the claims of an administrative assistant with diabetes who 
controlled her condition to some degree with daily blood sugar tests and daily injections of 
insulin); Chenoweth v. Hillsborough Co., 250 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 1131 (2002) (dismissing the claims of a nurse with focal onset epilepsy controlled 
by medication). 
18. ADAAA, supra note 12, § 2(b). 
19. Id. § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102). 
20. Id. § 4 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With 
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the new EEOC regulations clarify that many mental illnesses, including 
major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia, will meet the definition 
of disability due to their substantial limitation of the major life activity of 
brain function.25  In summary, federal disability discrimination law includes 
both physical and mental impairments within the definition of disability.  In 
addition, the ADAAA and its new implementing regulations confirm that 
individuals with mental disabilities, even if such mental disabilities are 
mitigated or are episodic in nature, are protected from disability 
discrimination in the same manner as are individuals with more traditional 
physical disabilities.26 
In addition to disability discrimination law, civil rights and human rights 
laws also provide equal protections for individuals with physical and mental 
disabilities.  The Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, for example, provides 
equal protections for individuals with physical and mental disabilities in the 
employment, public accommodation, housing, education, credit, and other 
settings.27  The Minnesota Human Rights Act also provides equal 
protections for individuals with physical and mental disabilities in the 
employment, housing, public accommodations, public services, and 
education contexts.28  The State of Texas has enacted a number of civil 
rights provisions, including one that establishes a state policy of 
encouraging and enabling persons with disabilities to participate fully in the 
social and economic life of the state, to achieve maximum personal 
independence, to become gainfully employed, and to otherwise fully enjoy 
and use all public facilities available within the state.29  The policy equally 
protects individuals with physical and mental disabilities.30  The Illinois 
 
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48431 (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Proposed 
ADAAA Regulations]. 
24. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978 (March 25, 2011 [hereinafter Final 
ADAAA Regulations]. 
25. Id. at 17001 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (providing that, “It should 
easily be concluded that the following types of impairments will, at a minimum, 
substantially limit the major life activities indicated: . . . major depressive disorder, bipolar 
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia 
substantially limit brain function.”)). 
26. See id. (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vi) (“The determination of whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.”) and (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) 
(explaining, “An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active.”)). 
27. IOWA CODE §§ 216.1, 216.2(5) (2010). 
28. MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.02, subd. 1, 363A.03, subd. 12 (2010). 
29. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 121.001 (2010). 
30. Id. § 121.002(4). 
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Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) similarly identifies freedom from unlawful 
discrimination as an important state public policy.31  To that end, the IHRA 
makes discrimination based on either physical or mental disability unlawful 
in a variety of settings, including employment, real estate, financial credit, 
and public accommodations.32 
In addition to civil rights and human rights laws, federal and state health 
information confidentiality laws also provide equal, if not more, 
confidentiality protections for individuals with mental illness.  On August 
21, 1996, President Clinton signed the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) into law.33  Section 264 of HIPAA 
directed the federal Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to 
adopt regulations protecting the privacy of individually identifiable health 
information if Congress failed to enact privacy legislation within three 
years of the date of HIPAA’s enactment.34  When Congress failed to enact 
privacy legislation by its statutory deadline, HHS incurred the duty to adopt 
a privacy rule (“Privacy Rule”).35  Under the Privacy Rule36 as directed to 
be amended by President Obama through the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (“HITECH”) Act,37 both 
covered entities and business associates must maintain the confidentiality of 
protected health information (“PHI”) that they obtain, maintain, use, or 
disclose.38  The Privacy Rule defines PHI as a subset of “individually 
identifiable health information”39 which, in turn, is defined as a subset of 
“health information.”40  “Health information” is defined to include any 
information relating to an individual’s past, present, or future physical or 
mental health condition.41  Regardless of whether a patient has a physical or 
 
31. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/1-101, 1-102(A) (2010). 
32. Id. § 5/1-102(A). 
33. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936  (1996). 
34. Id. § 264 (stating, “If legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy of 
individually identifiable health information . . . is not enacted by the date that is 36 months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall 
promulgate final regulations containing such standards . . .”). 
35. Id. 
36. 45 C.F.R. § 164, subpart E. 
37. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, in 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001-13424, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009) [hereinafter, HITECH]. 
38. Id. § 13404(a); 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (2010); Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, 
Security, and Enforcement Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health Act; Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 40868, 40919 (July 14, 2010) 
[hereinafter the HIPAA Proposed Rule].  As of this writing, HHS has yet to issue a final rule 
modifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule in accordance with HITECH. 
39. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2010). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
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mental condition, then, the patient’s PHI is protected under the Privacy 
Rule. 
Interestingly, the Privacy Rule also provides heightened confidentiality 
protections for individuals with respect to their psychotherapy notes.  The 
Privacy Rule defines “psychotherapy notes” as notes recorded by a mental 
health professional who is documenting or analyzing the contents of a 
conversation during an individual, group, joint, or family counseling 
session if such notes are separated from the rest of the medical records.42  
Covered entities and business associates that maintain psychotherapy notes 
are permitted to use and disclose psychotherapy notes only in very limited 
situations.43  On the other hand, covered entities and business associates are 
permitted to use non-psychotherapy note PHI in a broader range of 
situations, including in a variety of treatment, payment, healthcare 
operations, and public policy situations.44  The Privacy Rule is not the only 
legal authority that provides equal (or greater) confidentiality protections to 
individuals with mental illnesses.  A variety of other federal and state 
authorities provide special, or heightened, protections to the medical 
records of individuals who have mental illnesses, including records 
containing alcohol and drug abuse treatment information45 as well as more 
general mental health information.46 
In addition to health information confidentiality law, the healthcare 
reform bill also contains several anti-discrimination provisions that apply 
equally to individuals with physical and mental illness.  Section 1201 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as reconciled by the Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act (collectively, “ACA”), for example, 
clarifies that a group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering 
group or individual health insurance coverage may not establish rules for 
eligibility or continued eligibility based on certain health-related status 
factors, including both physical and mental illness.47  Likewise, section 
1302 of ACA requires qualified health plans to provide an essential health 
benefits package that includes not only traditional medical and surgical 
services, such as ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospital 
services, maternity and newborn care, prescription drugs, rehabilitation 
services, laboratory services, preventive and wellness services, chronic 
 
42. Id. § 164.501. 
43. Id. § 164.508(a)(2). 
44. See, e.g., id. §§ 164.506, 164.512. 
45. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 2 (2010). 
46. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 228.1, 228.2(1) (2010). 
47. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010) [hereinafter 
PPACA], as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
152 (2010) [hereinafter HCERA] [as consolidated, ACA] § 1201. 
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disease management, and pediatric services,48 but also mental health and 
substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatments.49 
Child and adult health and welfare laws that prohibit (and require the 
reporting of) abuse and neglect of children and vulnerable adults also are 
designed to prevent both physical and mental injuries and illnesses.  Texas 
law, for example, requires a person having cause to believe that a child’s 
physical or mental health or welfare has been adversely affected by abuse or 
neglect to report the suspected abuse or neglect to a state authority.50  Texas 
law defines ‘abuse’ as both physical injury that results in substantial harm 
to a child51 as well as mental and emotional injury to a child,52 and defines 
“neglect” in terms of both physical and mental neglect.53  Similarly, 
Minnesota declares in its statutes a state policy of protecting adults who, 
“because of physical or mental disability,” are particularly vulnerable to 
maltreatment.54  To that end, the Minnesota Department of Human Services 
assists in providing safe environments for vulnerable adults, requires the 
reporting of suspected maltreatment of vulnerable adults, mandates the 
investigation of such reports, and provides protective and counseling 
services in appropriate cases.55 
II. DEFINITIONS OF HEALTH 
I also wanted to examine the definitions of “health” provided by 
international, national, state, professional, and other authorities for use in a 
range of clinical, legal, and social contexts to see whether these authorities 
subordinate mental health to physical health or otherwise identify physical 
wellness as a greater contributor to overall health.  I started with the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”), which is the directing and coordinating 
authority for health within the United Nations (“UN”).56  As part of its 
authority within the UN, the WHO is responsible for providing leadership 
on global health matters, shaping the public health research agenda, setting 
public health norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy 
options, providing technical support to countries, and monitoring and 
assessing health trends.57  Since 1948, the WHO has defined “health” as “a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
 
48. Id. § 1301(a)(1)(B); (b)(1)(A)-(D), (F)-(J). 
49. Id. § 1302(b)(1)(E). 
50. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 261.101(a), 261.103 (2010). 
51. Id. § 261.001(1)(c). 
52. Id. § 261.001(1)(a). 
53. Id. § 261.001(4)(a). 
54. MINN. STAT. § 626.557, subd. 1 (2010). 
55. Id. 
56. World Health Organization, About WHO (2011), http://www.who.int/about/en/. 
57. Id. 
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absence of disease or infirmity.”58  The WHO definition thus fails to 
subordinate mental health to physical health and identifies both physical 
health and mental health as equal contributors to overall health. 
HHS is the United States government’s principal agency for protecting 
the health of all Americans and providing essential human services.59HHS 
operates more than 300 programs that are, according to HHS, designed to 
provide for the “equitable treatment of beneficiaries nationwide.”60  On its 
new HealthCare.gov Web site, HHS explains to all Americans: “[y]our 
mental health is just as important to your quality of life as your physical 
health.  For too long, mental health has taken a back seat to physical health 
in our health insurance system.  Mental health parity laws, including rules 
issued by the Obama administration earlier this year, have taken important 
steps forward to stop the insurance company practice of arbitrarily limiting 
care for mental health or substance use disorders.”61  Nowhere in any of its 
regulations does HHS define the word “health.”  However, HHS defines 
“health care” in a number of its regulations to include care relating to the 
“physician or mental condition” of an individual.62  HHS also defines 
“patient” as “any individual who is receiving health care items or services, 
including any item or service provided to meet his or her physical, mental 
or emotional needs or well-being . . . “63  HHS further defines “health 
information” as “any information . . . relating to the past, present, or future 
physical or mental condition of an individual . . .”64 
HHS heavily regulates healthcare providers and suppliers that participate 
in and receive reimbursement from federal and state healthcare programs, 
including Medicare and Medicaid.  HHS’ regulations are designed to 
equally protect patients’ physical and mental health.  For example, 
Medicare-participating hospitals are prohibited from physically and 
mentally abusing their inpatients and outpatients.65  Medicare-participating 
nursing homes also are prohibited from physically and mentally abusing 
their residents.66  HHS requires Medicare-participating nursing homes to 
develop care plans that will attain for nursing home residents their “highest 
 
58. World Health Organization, Definition of Health (2011), https://apps.who.int/about 
who/en/definition.html . 
59. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., About HHS (2010), http://www.hhs.gov/about/. 
60. Id. 
61. Pamela S. Hyde, The Affordable Care Act & Mental Health: An Update, 
HEALTHCARE BLOG (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.healthcare.gov/blog/2010/08/mentalhealth 
update.html. 
62. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2010). 
63. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2 (2010). 
64. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2010). 
65. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e) (2010). 
66. Id. § 483.13(b). 
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practicable physical, mental, and psycho-social well-being.”67  HHS also 
requires state Medicaid plans to provide early and periodic screening and 
diagnosis of eligible Medicaid recipients under age twenty-one to ascertain 
both “physical and mental defects” and to provide treatments for such 
defects.68  In summary, HHS does not subordinate mental health to physical 
health in any of its programs, services, or requirements, and appears to have 
as its goal the promotion of both physical and mental health.  Indeed, the 
Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, a department 
within HHS, explains that “one of the foremost contributions of 
contemporary mental health research is the extent to which it has mended 
the destructive split between “mental” and “physical” health.”69 
In addition to international organizations and national agencies such as 
WHO and HHS, federal and state courts and legislatures also interpret 
health to include both physical and mental components.  Words and 
Phrases, a multi-volume treatise containing thousands of judicial 
definitions of words and phrases that have taken on special meaning in the 
law, contains an entry for the word “health” that identifies thirteen relevant 
federal and state court opinions.70  Almost all of these court opinions define 
“health” with express reference to both physical and mental health, and not 
one of these judicial opinions expressly limits health to physical health.  In 
U.S. v. Vuitch, for example, the United States Supreme Court interprets the 
definition of “health” with respect to the District of Columbia’s abortion 
statute to include both physical and mental health.71  In State v. Payne, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut interprets the word “health” for purposes of 
a Connecticut criminal child protection statute, and includes in such 
interpretation both physical and mental health.72  In Gross v. State, the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana clarifies that the word “health” for purposes of 
an Indiana criminal dependency neglect statute is not limited to physical 
health, but also includes an individual’s psychological, mental, and 
 
67. Id. § 483.20(k)(1)(i). 
68. Id. § 441.50. 
69. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVS. ADMIN., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 418 (1999) 
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT]. 
70. Health, in WORDS & PHRASES 269, 269-70 (West 2005). 
71. U.S. v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971). 
72. State v. Payne, 695 A.2d 525, 528 (Conn. 1997) (stating, 
We agree that, because the phrase “life or limb is endangered” indicates the intent 
of the legislature to protect children from conduct creating a risk of physical 
injury, and because the phrase “morals likely to be impaired” expresses the 
legislature’s intent to prohibit conduct threatening the morality of children, the 
phrase “health is likely to be injured” must include the risk of injury to the mental 
health of a child in order to avoid redundancy within the first part of the statute.). 
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emotional health.73  In Venable v. Gulf Taxi Line, a final example involving 
a motor car personal injury case dating back to the early 1900s, the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia explained that the word 
“health” means “the state of being hale, sound, or whole in body, mind or 
soul.”74 
Medical and lay dictionaries and classification manuals also define 
“health” with reference to both physical and mental well-being.  Dorland’s 
Medical Dictionary defines “health” as “[a]n optimal state of physical, 
mental, and social well-being; the popular idea that it is merely an absence 
of disease and infirmity is not complete.”75  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“health” as “[t]he state of being sound or whole in body, mind, or soul.”76  
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines 
“health” as “[s]oundness, especially of body or mind . . . “77  The current 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(“DSM”) does not contain a definition of “health.”78  However, the DSM 
does in its discussion of the term “mental disorder” state that the term 
implies a distinction between mental disorders and physical disorders “that 
is a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism.”79  According to the 
DSM, “[a] compelling literature documents that there is much ‘physical’ in 
‘mental’ disorders and much ‘mental’ in ‘physical’ disorders.”80 
III. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM 
Notwithstanding the fact that health-related doctrine outside the context 
of mental health parity law prohibits discrimination against individuals with 
mental illness and the fact that international, national, state, professional, 
and other definitions of “health” fail to subordinate mental health to 
physical health or otherwise identify physical wellness as a greater 
contributor to overall health, current federal mental health parity law 
continues to allow many public health care program beneficiaries and 
 
73. Gross v. State, 817 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. App. 2004) (stating, “Under the neglect 
statute, ‘health’ is not limited to one’s physical state, but includes an individual’s 
psychological, mental and emotional status.”). 
74. Venable v. Gulf Taxi Line, 141 S.E. 622, 624 (W.Va. 1928) (stating, “As counsel 
very well argue by their reference to the definitions given in the books, health means the 
‘state of being hale, sound or whole in body, mind or soul, well being.’”). 
75. DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2007), available at 
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/ehsdorland/health. 
76. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 737 (8th ed. 2004). 
77. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 808 (Houghton 
Mifflin 2006). 
78. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (2000). 
79. Id. at xxx. 
80. Id. 
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private health plan members to be subject to inferior mental health 
insurance benefits. I suggest that these remaining legal distinctions between 
physical and mental illness may emanate from the centuries-old mind-body 
problem, which continues to animate health law, philosophy of the mind, 
and other legal and philosophical doctrine.81 
The central feature of the mind-body problem is the nature of the 
relationship between the mind and the body, including the relationship that 
exists between minds (or mental processes) and body states (or physical 
processes).82  The two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the 
mind-body problem include dualism and monism.83  Substance dualists 
argue that the mind is an independently existing substance,84 whereas 
property dualists maintain that the mind is not a distinct substance but that 
the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot 
be reduced to the brain.85  Monists, on the other hand, believe that mind and 
body are not ontologically entities.86  Most modern philosophers of the 
mind adopt a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in 
their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the 
body.87  Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties 
 
81. See, e.g., Kirk Ludwig, The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview, in THE BLACKWELL 
GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 1-46 (Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield eds., 2007) 
(explaining the traditional mind-body problem, possible solutions, and obstacles to 
solutions); SUSAN SCHNEIDER, THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: RETHINKING THE SOLUTION SPACE 
(forthcoming Oxford University Press 2011) (examining leading solutions to the mind-body 
problem); John R. Searle, The Future of Philosophy, 354 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL 
SCI. 2069, 2075 (1999) (explaining that the mind-body problem is one part of a much 
broader set of issues known collectively as the philosophy of mind). 
82. See, e.g., Searle, supra note 81, at 2073 (asking, “What exactly are the relations 
between consciousness and the brain?”). 
83. See, e.g., Cecil H. Miller, The Basic Question: Monism or Dualism? 14 PHIL. SCI. 1, 
7-12 (1947) (describing the competing schools of monism and dualism; concluding, in 1947, 
“That the substance of monism is sufficient, however, has by no means been proven.  For 
dualism will still be tenable until the last bit of the unknown has been made a part of the 
known.  And at least until then articulate human beings, we may be certain, will continue to 
give it devout and enthusiastic support.”). 
84. See, e.g., Ludwig, supra note 81, at 13 (examining substance dualism); William C. 
Lycan, Giving Dualism its Due, 87 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 551, 551-63 (2009)  (arguing that 
no convincing case has been made against substance dualism). 
85. See, e.g., Howard Robinson, Dualism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ (examining property 
dualism and explaining that, “In the case of mind, property dualism is defended by those 
who argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is not merely another way of 
categorizing states of the brain or of behaviour, but a genuinely emergent phenomenon.”). 
86. See, e.g., PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND, TOWARD A UNIFIED SCIENCE OF THE MIND-
BRAIN 3 (MIT Press 1986) (developing a monist, or unified, theory of the mind-brain); 
Miller, supra note 83, at 7 (stating, “Monism, postulating a single, universal and 
homogeneous substance, lays itself open to charges of oversimplification and reduction.”). 
87. See, e.g., Ludwig, supra note 81, at 9 (characterizing physicalism); Daniel Stoljar, 
Physicalism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2009), 
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will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological 
processes and states.88  Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the 
brain is all there is to the mind, the predicates and vocabulary used in 
mental descriptions and explanations are indispensible, and cannot be 
reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.89  
Other modern philosophers, however, adopt a non-physicalist position that 
challenges the notion that the mind is a purely physical construct.90 
Countless legal subjects are influenced by the mind-body problem.  Clear 
examples include the nature of the concepts of personhood and 
responsibility for purposes of criminal law,91 the nature of the concepts of 
personhood, consciousness, and death for purposes of withholding and 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment as well as organ donation law,92 and 
 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ (examining reductive and non-
reductive physicalism). 
88. See, e.g., Stoljar, supra note 87 (explaining, “Applied to the philosophy of mind, 
th[e] notion [of reductive physicalism] might be thought of entailing the idea that every 
mental concept or predicate is analyzed in terms of a physical concept or predicate.”). 
89. See, e.g., Robert Van Gulick, Consciousness, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2009), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
consciousness/ (explaining, “Non-reductive physicalism . . . denies that the theoretical and 
conceptual resources appropriate and adequate for dealing with facts at the level of the 
underlying substrate or realization level must be adequate as well for dealing with those at 
the realized level”).  But see Jaegwon Kim, The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism, 
PROCEEDINGS & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASSOC., Nov. 1989, at 31, 32 (claiming that a 
physicalist only has two options; that is, eliminativism and reductionism; arguing that non-
reductive materialism is a myth). 
90. See, e.g., Stoljar, supra note 87 (presenting three cases against physicalism, 
including qualia and consciousness, meaning and intentionality, and methodological issues). 
91. See, e.g., Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes 
Nothing and Everything, in NEUROETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH READINGS 232-258 
(Martha J. Farah ed., 2010) (examining whether our emerging understanding of the mind as 
brain really has any deep implications for the law); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim 
Symdrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, in NEUROETHICS: AN 
INTRODUCTION WITH READINGS 268-280 (Martha J. Farah ed., 2010) (providing a contextual 
foundation for how to think about the relation of neuroscience to criminal responsibility); 
Stephen Morse, Moral and Legal Responsibility and the New Neuroscience, in 
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 33-50 (Judy Illes ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (describing the dominant conception of personhood and 
responsibility in Western law and morality and contending that neuroscience is largely 
irrelevant if the concept of responsibility is properly understood and evaluated); Stephen 
Sedley, Responsibility and the Law, in THE NEW BRAIN SCIENCES: PERILS AND PROSPECTS 
123-130 (Dai Rees & Steven Rose eds., 2004) (viewing the law on human responsibility for 
acts which harm others as a set of historic and moral compromises). 
92. See, e.g., Abdallah S. Daar, The Body, the Soul, and Organ Donation Beliefs of the 
Major World Religions, 14 NEFROLOGIA 78, 78-81 (1994) (examining religious and 
philosophical approaches to living organ donation, cadaver organ donation, and the 
establishment of death using brain-death criteria); Renée C. Fox & David P. Willis, 
Personhood, Medicine, and American Science, 61 MILBANK MEM. FUND QUARTERLY, 
HEALTH & SOC’Y 127, 129 (1983) (explaining that discussions about personhood in the 
context of bioethics frequently focus on the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining 
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the nature of the concepts of physical health and mental health for purposes 
of health insurance law and mental health parity law.93  If an expert who 
testifies in a health insurance coverage dispute brings to her testimony a 
reductive physicalist perspective and asserts that all mental states and 
properties eventually will be explained by scientific accounts of 
physiological processes, then the outcome may be the classification of a 
traditional mental illness as a physical illness for purposes of interpreting 
the health insurance policy.  On the other hand, a substance dualist may 
object to a legal merger of physical and mental illness for purposes of 
health insurance law as well as other areas of civil, criminal, and 
administrative doctrine.  I suggest that the mind-body problem, which 
stubbornly resists solution,94 also may be playing a role in the persistence of 
mental health benefit disparities. 
IV. THE ROLE OF STIGMA 
If the relevant clinical, economic, and social literatures do not support 
mental health benefit disparities,95 why do they remain?  If studies show 
that mental health parity implementation has not increased and may actually 
decrease total health care costs,96 why is mental health parity not mandatory 
across all payor settings?  If studies show that untreated mental illness is 
associated with decreased rates of work productivity and increased rates of 
disability, homelessness, welfare, and criminal activity,97 why do our 
federal and state legislatures not prioritize mental health parity and justify it 
as a benefit to society?  If courts are unable to meaningfully distinguish 
between physical and mental illness in health insurance coverage disputes,98 
why do judges insist on perpetuating artificial distinctions based on the area 
of specialization of the treating health care provider, the nature and type of 
treatment, the origin of the illness, and the symptoms of the illness?  If 
other areas of health-related legal doctrine do not provide inferior legal 
protections or benefits for individuals with mental illness, why does health 
insurance law continue to do so?  If international, national, state, and 
 
treatment). 
93. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 5-6 (containing a separate 
section entitled, “Mind and Body Are Inseparable” and referencing within that section 
theories of the mind and its relation to the body). 
94. See, e.g., Ludwig, supra note 81, at 29-30 (explaining the persistence of the mind-
body problem); Colin McGinn, Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? 98 MIND 349, 349-
366 (1989) (stating, “We have been trying for a long time to solve the mind-body problem. It 
has stubbornly resisted our best efforts. The mystery persists. I think the time has come to 
admit candidly that we cannot resolve the mystery.”). 
95. See Tovino, supra note 1, at Sections I(B)-(E). 
96. See id. at Section I(B). 
97. See id. at Section I(C). 
98. See id. at Section I(E). 
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professional definitions of “health” used throughout the clinical, legal, and 
social literatures fail to subordinate mental health to physical health, why 
does health insurance law continue to do so? 
I believe the answer is stigma.99  The stigma associated with mental 
illness has served as a formidable obstacle to mental health parity even 
when all other obstacles have been removed.100  Identifying the reasons for 
persistent mental health disparities is important for framing an argument 
against them.  I could frame my mental health parity proposals as economic 
efficiency measures aimed to achieve cost savings in public and private 
payor settings.  I also could frame mental health parity as a social measure 
that is necessary to resolve problems associated with unemployment, 
disability, homelessness, welfare, and criminal activity.  The data I 
presented in my earlier work101 would support the characterization of my 
mental health parity proposals in both of these ways.  I prefer instead to 
frame mental health parity as both a clinically-oriented and anti-
discrimination measure that is intended to reduce the suffering of, improve 
the daily functioning of, and remove the stigma associated with individuals 
who have mental illness. 
Elsewhere, I traced and closely examined the roots of stigma associated 
with mental illness.102  Historically, individuals with mental illness were 
regarded with contempt, fear, and cruelty, perhaps due to the belief that 
mental illness stemmed from poor parenting, demonic possession, or 
deficient character.103  Mental illness remains poorly understood today.104  
Mental Health America, the leading U.S. nonprofit organization devoted to 
improving the lives of individuals with mental illness, estimates that 71 
percent of Americans continue to believe that mental illness is caused by 
mental weakness, 65 percent believe that mental illness is the product of 
poor parenting, and 35 percent believe that mental illness is a form of 
retribution for sinful or immoral behavior.105  According to the Surgeon 
 
99. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 3 (stating, “The most formidable 
obstacle to mental health parity is stigma.”). 
100. See id. (arguing that, “Stigmatization of mental illness is an excuse for inaction and 
discrimination that is inexcusably outmoded . . . “); UNIV. TEXAS MENTAL HEALTH POLICY 
ANALYSIS COLLABORATIVE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNTREATED MENTAL ILLNESS IN 
HOUSTON 18 (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter, UNTREATED MENTAL ILLNESS] (stating, “Although 
there has been recent improvement, today mental illness remains one of the most stigmatized 
of all medical disorders.”). 
101. See Tovino, supra note 1, at Part I(B)-(E). 
102. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative 
Approach? 42 AKRON L. REV. 469, 475 (2009). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id.  See generally Mental Health America, Welcome (2010), http://www.nmha.org/ 
(characterizing itself as the country’s leading nonprofit organization dedicated to helping all 
people live mentally healthier lives.). 
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General, the stigma associated with mental illness manifests itself through 
bias, distrust, stereotyping, fear, embarrassment, anger, and avoidance of 
individuals with mental illness.106  The stigma associated with mental 
illness also contributes to people avoiding living with, socializing with, 
working with, renting to, and employing mentally ill individuals.107  The 
stigma associated with mental illness also deters patients from seeking, and 
the public and third party payors from wanting to pay for, mental health 
care.108  Perhaps most concerning, the stigma associated with mental illness 
deprives mentally ill individuals of their dignity and interferes with their 
ability to fully participate in society.109  In an attempt to reduce the 
suffering and improve the daily functioning of individuals with mental 
illness and to remove the stigma associated with mental illness,110 I thus 
continue to propose the extension of mental health parity law and 
mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits to all public 
health care program beneficiaries and private health plan members. 
 
 
106. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 6. 
107. See id.; UNTREATED MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 100, at 18 (stating, “People are 
no more willing to have social connections to people with mental illness today than in the 
past.”). 
108. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 131, at 6.  See also id. at 8 (stating, 
“Another manifestation of stigma is reflected in the public’s reluctance to pay for mental 
health services.”); id. at 454 (stating, “[Stigma] gives insurers – in the public sector as well 
as the private – tacit permission to restrict coverage for mental health services in ways that 
would not be tolerated for other illnesses.”). 
109. Id. at 6. 
110. See also id. at 454 (stating, “For our Nation to reduce the burden of mental illness, 
to improve access to care, and to achieve urgently needed knowledge about the brain, mind, 
and behavior, stigma must no longer be tolerated.”). 
